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Abstract—Atomic Crosschain Transaction technology allows
composable programming across private Ethereum blockchains.
It allows for inter-contract and inter-blockchain function calls
that are both synchronous and atomic: if one part fails, the
whole call graph of function calls is rolled back. Traditional
Ethereum contract functions can limit which accounts can call
them by specialised application program logic. This is important
as it allows application developers to specify which callers can
execute functions that update contract state. In this paper we
introduce the strategy required to restrict which contracts on one
blockchain can call a function in a contract that is deployed on
another blockchain. We show that validating the Originating
Blockchain Id (the blockchain the crosschain function call
started on), From Blockchain Id, and From Account pro-
vides contracts with certainty that a function call came from a
specific contract on a specific blockchain.
I. INTRODUCTION
Atomic Crosschain Transactions [1] for Ethereum Private
Sidechains [2] and private Ethereum blockchains allow for
inter-contract and inter-blockchain function calls that are both
synchronous and atomic. Atomic Crosschain Transactions are
special nested Ethereum transactions that include additional
fields to facilitate the atomic behaviour securely. This new
type of Ethereum transaction has great promise, but introduces
a new set of challenges.
Traditional Ethereum transactions [3] execute within a sin-
gle blockchain. For example, in Fig. 1 an Externally Owned
Account (EOA) submits a transaction that calls the function
sender in Contract A that in turn calls the function
receiver in Contract B. Contract B could be a
simple contract that holds data and has little or no business
logic. Contract A may be a complex contract that holds the
majority or all of the business logic of the application. The
business logic may need to change over time. Additionally,
like any complex software, a complex contract may have
defects which need to be resolved. The typical approach to this
scenario in a blockchain setting is to deploy a new version of
Contract A and have Contract B’s receiver func-
tion only allow calls from the newly deployed Contract A
[4]. The Solidity code that would allow this to occur is shown
in Listing 1.
On line 2 of the listing msg.sender, the address of the
contract or EOA that called this function, is compared against
a variable authorisedAddress. This value is the address
of the deployed instance of Contract A that is authorised
to call the receiver function. The transaction executing the
function call is aborted if the two values do not match. This
line of code ensures Contract B’s receiver function can
only be called by functions in an authorised deployed instance
of Contract A.
Listing 1: Application Authentication
1 function receiver() external {
2 require(msg.sender == authorisedAddress);
3 ...
4 }
The scenario for a crosschain transaction is more complex.
In Fig. 2 Contract A has been deployed to Private
Blockchain A and Contract B has been deployed to
Private Blockchain B. An EOA submits a transac-
tion that calls the function sender in Contract A on
Private Blockchain A that in turn calls the function
receiver in Contract B on Private Blockchain
B. This paper describes the application logic required to
limit function calls to the function receiver in Contract
B to only those coming from Contract A on Private
Blockchain A.
II. ATOMIC CROSSCHAIN TRANSACTIONS
A. Nested Transactions
Atomic Crosschain Transactions are nested Ethereum trans-
actions and views. Transactions are function calls that update
state. Views are function calls that return a value but do not
update state. Fig. 3 shows a EOA calling a function funcA1
in contract conA1 on blockchain Private Blockchain
A. This function in turn calls function funcB, that in turn calls
functions funcC and funcA2, each on separate blockchains.
Fig. 1: Traditional Transaction Function Call within One
Blockchain
Fig. 2: Crosschain Transaction Function Call across Two
Blockchains
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2Fig. 3: Originating Transaction containing Two Nested Subor-
dinate Transactions and a Subordinate View
Fig. 4: Nested Transactions and Views
The transaction submitted by the EOA is called the Originating
Transaction. The transactions that the Originating Transaction
causes to be submitted are called Subordinate Transactions.
Subordinate Views may also be triggered. In Fig. 3, a Sub-
ordinate View is used to call funcC. This function returns a
value to funcB.
Fig. 4 shows the nested structure of the Atomic Crosschain
Transaction. The EOA user first creates the signed Subordi-
nate View for Private Blockchain C, contract conC,
function funcC and the signed Subordinate Transaction
for Private Blockchain A, contract conA2, function
funcA2. They then create the signed Subordinate Transac-
tion for Private Blockchain B, contract conB, func-
tion funcB, and include the signed Subordinate Transac-
tion and View. Finally, they sign the Originating Transaction
for Private Blockchain A, contract conA1, function
funcA1, including the signed Subordinate Transactions and
View.
When the EOA submits the Originating Transaction to a
node, the node processes the transaction using the algorithm
shown in Listing 2. If the transaction includes any Subordinate
Views, they are dispatched and their results are cached (Lines
1 to 3). The function is then executed (Lines 4 to 17). If a
Subordinate Transaction function call is encountered, the node
checks that the parameter values passed to the Subordinate
Transaction function call match the parameter values in the
signed Subordinate Transaction (Lines 6 to 8). If a Subordinate
View function call is encountered, the node checks that the
parameters passed to the Subordinate View function call match
the parameter values in the signed Subordinate View (Lines 9
and 10). The cached values of the results of the Subordinate
View function calls are then returned to the executing code
(Line 11). If the execution has completed without error, then
each of the signed Subordinate Transactions is submitted to a
node on the appropriate blockchain (Nodes 18 to 20).
Listing 2: Originating or Subordinate Transaction Processing
1 For All Subordinate Views {
2 Dispatch Subordinate Views & cache results
3 }
4 Trial Execution of Function Call {
5 While Executing Code {
6 If Subordinate Transaction function called {
7 check expected & actual parameters match.
8 }
9 Else If Subordinate View function is called {
10 check expected & actual parameters match
11 return cached results to code
12 }
13 Else {
14 Execute Code As Usual
15 }
16 }
17 }
18 For All Subordinate Transactions {
19 Submit Subordinate Transactions
20 }
B. Blockchain Signing and Threshold Signatures
BLS Threshold Signatures [5], [6] combines the ideas of
threshold cryptography [7] with Boneh-Lynn-Shacham(BLS)
signatures [8], and uses a Pedersen commitment scheme [9]
to ensure verifiable secret sharing. The scheme allows any M
validator nodes of the total N validator nodes on a blockchain
to sign messages in a distributed way such that the private
key shares do not need to be assembled to create a signature.
Each validator node creates a signature share by signing the
message using their private key share. Any M of the total N
signature shares can be combined to create a valid signature.
Importantly, the signature contains no information about which
nodes signed, or what the threshold number of signatures (M)
needed to create the signature is.
The Atomic Crosschain Transaction system uses BLS
Threshold Signatures to prove that information came from
a specific blockchain. For example, in Fig. 3, nodes on
Private Blockchain B can be certain of results re-
turned by a node on Private Blockchain C for the
function call to funcC, as the results are threshold signed
by the validator nodes on Private Blockchain C. Sim-
ilarly, validator nodes on Private Blockchain A can
be certain that validator nodes on Private Blockchain
B have mined the Subordinate Transaction, locked contract
conB and are holding the updated state as a provisional update
because validator nodes sign a Subordinate Transaction Ready
message indicating that the Subordinate Transaction is ready
to be committed.
C. Crosschain Coordination
Crosschain Coordination Contracts exist on Coordination
Blockchains. They allow validator nodes to determine whether
the provisional state updates related to the Originating Trans-
action and Subordinate Transactions should be committed or
3discarded. The contract is also used to determine a common
time-out for all blockchains, and as a repository of Blockchain
Public Keys.
When a user creates a Crosschain Transaction, they specify
the Coordination Blockchain and Crosschain Coordination
Contract to be used for the transaction, and the time-out for
the transaction in terms of a block number on the Coordi-
nation Blockchain. The validator node that they submit the
Originating Transaction to (the Originating Node) works with
other validator nodes on the blockchain to sign a Crosschain
Transaction Start message. This message is submitted to the
Crosschain Coordination Contract to indicate to all nodes
on all blockchains that the Crosschain Transaction has com-
menced.
When the Originating Node has received Subordinate Trans-
action Ready messages for all Subordinate Transactions, it
works with other validator nodes to create a Crosschain Trans-
action Commit message. This message is submitted to the
Crosschain Coordination Contract to indicate to all nodes on
all blockchains that the Crosschain Transaction has completed
and all provisional updates should be committed. If an error
is detected, then a Crosschain Transaction Ignore message is
created and submitted to the Crosschain Coordination Contract
to indicate to all nodes on all blockchains that the Crosschain
Transaction has failed and all provisional updates should be
discarded. Similarly, if the transaction times-out, all provi-
sional updates will be discarded.
D. Crosschain Transaction Fields
Originating Transactions, Subordinate Transactions, and
Subordinate Views contain the fields shown in Table I. Some
of the information in the standard Ethereum transaction fields
are exposed to blockchain application contract code, such as
the value field via the Solidity code msg.value. The new
extended crosschain transaction fields are made available to
blockchain application contract code via a precompile contract.
All nodes that process the transaction check that the
Coordination Blockchain Id, Crosschain Co-
ordination Contract, Crosschain Transaction
Time-out, Crosschain Transaction Id, and
Originating Blockchain Id are consistent across
the transaction or view they are processing, and the nested
Subordinate Transactions and Views. The nodes also
check that the To address and From Address, and the
blockchain identifier obtained from the V field and the From
Blockchain Id match across transactions and views.
The To address is the address of the contract containing
the function called on a blockchain. For example, the function
(f1) in contract (c1) could call a function (f2) in another
contract (c2) on the same blockchain (b1). The second contract
(c2) could call a function (f3) in a contract (c3) on another
blockchain (b2) via a Subordinate Transaction. The From
Address of the Subordinate Transaction will match the To
address of the transaction on the first blockchain (b1). This will
be the address first contract (c1). It will however, not match
the address of the second contract (c2), which is the function
that caused the Subordinate Transaction to be triggered.
III. APPLICATION AUTHENTICATION
As with traditional Ethereum transactions, the type of
application level authentication required for a Crosschain
Field Description
Standard Ethereum Transaction Fields
Nonce Per-account, per-blockchain transaction number.
GasPrice Amount offered to pay for gas for the transaction.
GasLimit Maximum gas which can be used by the transaction.
To Address of the account to send the value to, or the
address of a contract to call.
Value Amount of Ether to transfer.
Data Encoded function signature and parameter values.
V Part of the transaction digital signature & blockchain
identifier this transaction must execute on.
R Part of the transaction digital signature.
S Part of the transaction digital signature.
Additional Crosschain Transaction Fields
Type Type of crosschain transaction (e.g. Originating
Transaction)
Coordination Blockchain identifier of Coordination Blockchain to
Blockchain Id use for this transaction.
Crosschain Address of the Crosschain Coordination Contract
Coordination to use for this transaction.
Contract
Crosschain Coordination Blockchain block number when this
Transaction transaction will time out.
Time-out
Crosschain Identifies this crosschain transaction.
Transaction Id
Originating Blockchain identifier of the blockchain the
Blockchain Id Originating Node is on.
From Blockchain identifier of the blockchain that the
Blockchain Id function call executed on that resulted in this
Subordinate Transaction or View being submitted.
From To address from the transaction or view that resulted
Address in this Subordinate Transaction or View.
Subordinates List of Subordinate Transactions and Subordinate
Views that are called directly from this transaction
or view.
TABLE I: Crosschain Transaction Fields
Transaction will be application dependent.
A. No Authentication
Many functions will need no authentication at all. That is,
functions can be designed such that it is safe to execute a
transaction or return results of a view to any caller who is
able to access the function.
B. Using msg.sender or tx.origin
From the perspective of each Originating Transac-
tion, Subordinate Transaction or View, msg.sender and
tx.origin operate in the same way as a standard Ethereum
transaction. That is, if an EOA submitted a transaction that
called a function in contract A that then called a function in
contract B on the same blockchain, msg.sender for contract
B is contract A, and is the EOA for contract A. In both cases
tx.origin would be the EOA. In the context of a node pro-
cessing an Originating Transaction, Subordinate Transaction or
View, for the purposes of msg.sender and tx.origin, the
transaction or view appears as a separately signed transaction.
Given the similarities with standard Ethereum, msg.sender
and tx.origin could be used in the same way as standard
Ethereum to authenticate which EOA or contract on the same
blockchain called a function call using code similar to that
shown in Listing 1.
A key difference between standard Ethereum views and
Subordinate Views is that Subordinate Views are signed. As
such, the variables msg.sender and tx.origin can be
used within Subordinate Views, whereas they are not set in
4Fig. 5: Scenario 1: From and Originating Blockchain Untrusted
Fig. 6: Scenario 2: Originating Blockchain Untrusted
the context of normal Ethereum views (except for the case of
msg.sender when one contract calls another contract).
C. From Blockchain Id, From Address, and Originating
Blockchain Id
If a contract needs to only respond to calls from a
certain contract on a certain blockchain, then the code
in Listing 3 should be used. The code checks that
the From Blockchain Id and From Address match
the authorised blockchain and address, and checks that
the blockchains represented by From Blockchain Id
and Originating Blockchain Id are semi-trusted. By
semi-trusted it is meant that fewer than M validators oper-
ating the blockchain are Byzantine. Note that this scenario
implies the contract should allow for any msg.sender and
tx.origin.
Listing 3: Crosschain Application Authentication
1 function receiver() external {
2 address fromAddr = infoPrecompile(FROM_ADDR);
3 uint256 fromBcId = infoPrecompile(FROM_BCID);
4 uint256 origBcId = infoPrecompile(ORIG_BCID);
5 require(fromAddr == authorisedFromAddress);
6 require(fromBcId == authorisedFromBcId);
7 require(fromAddr == authorisedOrigBcId);
8 ...
9 }
IV. ANALYSIS
This section analyses the appropriateness of using the
Originating Blockchain Id, From Blockchain
Id, and From Address fields as a method of authentication,
and requiring the blockchains identified by Originating
Blockchain Id and From Blockchain Id be semi-
trusted. Figures 5 to 8 show four possible scenarios. The
participant could not trust the blockchains represented by
Originating Blockchain Id, From Blockchain
Id (scenario 1, Figure 5), just semi-trust the From
Blockchain Id or Originating Blockchain Id
1Semi-trusted is defined as having fewer than M Byzantine validator node
on a blockchain.
Fig. 7: Scenario 3: From Blockchain Untrusted
Fig. 8: Scenario 4: From and Originating Blockchain Semi-
Trusted1
(scenario 2, Figure 6 and scenario 3, Figure 7), or semi-
trust both blockchains (scenario 4, Figure 8). In the figures,
the Originating Blockchain is the blockchain identified by the
Originating Blockchain Id, the From Blockchain is
the blockchain identified by the From Blockchain Id,
and the Executing Blockchain is the blockchain executing the
transaction that contains the application level authentication
logic.
A. Scenario 1
If neither the Originating Blockchain or the From
Blockchain are trusted, then a nefarious actor operating the
validator nodes on the blockchains could maliciously construct
a Subordinate Transaction and submit it to the Executing
Blockchain. The nefarious actor could create valid Crosschain
Transaction Start and Commit messages and submit them
to the Coordinating Blockchain, thus making it appear that
all nodes on all blockchains should commit all parts of the
Crosschain Transaction.
The nodes on the Executing Blockchain have no basis to
trust information in the Subordinate Transaction submitted to
them or the Crosschain Transaction status indicated by the
Crosschain Coordination Contract. As such, there is no method
of application level authentication to restrict which contract on
which blockchain can call a function in a contract if neither
the Originating Blockchain nor the From Blockchain are semi-
trusted.
B. Scenario 2
If the From Blockchain is semi-trusted, but the Originat-
ing Blockchain is not trusted, then a nefarious actor could
create a malicious Crosschain Transaction. Rather than sub-
mitting a Subordinate Transaction to the From Blockchain,
they could bypass the blockchain, constructing a malicious
Subordinate Transaction with forged From Blockchain Id and
From Address, and submit it to the Executing Blockchain.
The nefarious actor could create valid Crosschain Transaction
Start and Commit messages and submit them to the Coordi-
nating Blockchain, thus making it appear that all nodes on
5all blockchains should commit all parts of the Crosschain
Transaction.
In this scenario, the nodes on the Executing Blockchain
have no way to be certain that the Subordinate Transaction
submitted to them originated from the From Blockchain. As
such, there is no method of application level authentication to
restrict which contract on which blockchain can call a function
in a contract if the Originating Blockchain is not semi-trusted.
C. Scenario 3
If the Originating Blockchain is semi-trusted, but the
From Blockchain is not trusted, then a nefarious actor could
claim a Subordinate Transaction being executed by the From
Blockchain was ready to be committed when it was not.
The nefarious actor would not be able to forge the From
Address or the From Blockchain Id of the subordinate
transaction as validators on the Originating Blockchain would
detect the mis-matched To and From Address addresses
or blockchains identifiers, and reject the invalid Crosschain
Transaction. In this case, they would refuse to mine the
Originating Transaction and refuse to create the Crosschain
Transaction Start message.
In this scenario, the nodes on the Executing Blockchain are
certain that the Subordinate Transaction submitted to them
has authentic From Address and From Blockchain
Id information. However, there is no certainty that the Subor-
dinate Transaction submitted to the From Blockchain will be
committed to that blockchain.
D. Scenario 4
If both the Originating Blockchain and the From Blockchain
are semi-trusted, then a nefarious actor is unable to subvert the
protocol. Similarly to section IV-C, invalid transactions they
submit will be rejected by validators nodes on the Originating
Blockchain. Validator nodes on the Execution Blockchain can
be sure that if the Crosschain Coordination Contract indicates
that the transaction should be committed, then all nodes,
including the From Blockchain, are ready to commit their
provisional updates.
V. IMPLEMENTATION
Examples of the Atomic Crosschain Transaction application
authentication code is available on github.com [10].
VI. DISCUSSION
The system assumes that blockchains involved in a cross-
chain transaction are semi-trusted, where semi-trusted is de-
fined as having fewer than M Byzantine validators nodes
operating a blockchain. This assumption of having a threshold
number of Byzantine validator nodes is the same type of
assumption that Byzantine Fault Tolerant (BFT) consensus
protocols make [11], [12]. As blockchains that support Atomic
Crosschain Transaction technology are likely to use a BFT
consensus protocol, if more than a threshold number of val-
idator nodes were Byzantine, then the blockchain’s consensus
protocol, as well as the crosschain transaction protocol, would
fail.
VII. CONCLUSION
Application programmers need to restrict which callers
can call functions in their contracts to update state. Tra-
ditional Ethereum security practices are not sufficient for
a crosschain transaction context. This paper presents the
fundamental building blocks of a crosschain authentica-
tion framework on which application-level authentication
can be built. In particular, when using Atomic Crosschain
Transactions, the Originating Blockchain Id, From
Blockchain Id, and the From Account crosschain
transaction fields can be used to ensure a function in a contract
on a blockchain is only callable from certain contracts on
certain blockchains, assuming that the participant that config-
ured the contract trusts that fewer than a threshold number of
validators on the blockchains indicated by the Originating
Blockchain Id, From Blockchain Id are Byzantine.
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